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Abstract
Does terrorism inhibit a country’s ability to attract international direct investment? If so, terrorism may have large
costs in terms of employment losses, macroeconomic instability, and missed development opportunities. However,
do investors fear terrorism because of direct risks to their assets, or because the opportunities in the host country
deteriorate? And how do they adjust investments? We study the impact of terrorism on merger and acquisition
decisions of 8,872 firms over 116 countries over 16 years. The firm-level perspective allows the isolation of host-
country terrorism from firm-level characteristics such as size or experience as an explanation, by comparing decisions
for the same firm across destinations. It also allows separation of investment responses into reductions or entire
withholding of investment. A sample standard deviation increase in terrorism reduces merger and acquisition
investment by around 30%. Firms do not generally reduce the size of their investment in the face of terrorism –
instead, they decide not to enter the country altogether. We find no evidence to suggest that multinational firms are
more sensitive to attacks on local business assets. A country-level analysis, which necessarily does not control for firm-
level characteristics, yields materially different conclusions.
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Introduction
Do terrorist attacks discourage multinational investment?
Multinationals probably wish to avoid the risk to their
personnel, physical damages, and reputational costs of
presence in terrorism-ridden countries. For instance, the
rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria led local multinationals like
Nestle´ and Heineken to raise concern over the local logis-
tics, access to local inputs, and the value of their local
assets.1 Intuitively, various recent results suggest that the
impact of terrorism is substantial. Abadie & Gardeazabal
(2008) conclude that a one standard deviation increase in
terroristic risk reduces the net foreign direct investment
(FDI) position of the country – a measure of multina-
tional investment – by approximately 5% of gross domes-
tic product. Similarly, Enders & Sandler (1996) find that
terrorism reduced annual country-level FDI by 13.5%
and 11.9% in Spain and Greece, respectively. Enders,
Sachsida & Sandler (2006), on the other hand, report that
US FDI flows show modest responses to terrorist attacks
in host counties. Strikingly, even if the physical costs of
terrorist attacks to firm assets are often low compared to
many other risks, the response of multinationals is strong.
One explanation is that international investments are
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1 See for example the respective annual reports of Nestle´ Nigeria
PLC, Heineken, and Nigerian Breweries PLC.
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particularly mobile and respond sensitively to small differ-
ences in (risk-adjusted) returns across countries (Abadie &
Gardeabazal, 2008).
The indirect costs of terrorism may be sizable, if terror-
ism discourages foreign investments. Foreign investment
generates employment opportunities, alleviates credit con-
straints, fills shortages of local savings, and brings knowl-
edge and skill to the country, so it is often heralded as a
pathway to economic development (e.g. Di Giovanni,
2005; Javorcik, 2004; Keller, 2010; Haskel, Pereira &
Slaughter, 2007). These opportunities are wasted if ter-
rorist attacks deter international investments.
The response of international investment to local con-
flict is also fundamental to theories of commercial liber-
alism and (external) capitalist peace. Foreign traders and
investors can amplify penalties on conflict, poor institu-
tions or human rights violations, thus encouraging peace
(Schneider, 2014; Faber & Gerritse, 2012; Greenhill,
Mosley & Prakash, 2009; Blanton & Apodaca, 2007).
Economic openness might also increase the levels of
development and contracting quality, and eliminate
incentives for conflict or rebellion (e.g. Weede, 2005;
Mousseau, 2010; de Soysa & Fjelde, 2010). Some argue
that capital mobility in particular has a disciplining effect
(Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001; Polachek, Seiglie &
Xiang, 2012; Kim & Trumbore, 2010): international
investors penalize local conflict severely. Recent results
suggest, however, that multinationals do not care about
local conflict as much as they care about potential attacks
on businesses (Powers & Choi, 2012). If multinationals
only avoid direct hostility towards themselves but do not
avoid destructive conflict in general, their role in capital-
ist peace may be small. This argument also links to
potential conflict traps. Once a state falls prey to terror-
ism or other conflict, international investment with-
draws, diminishing any force of punishment of the
conflict. A state might thus end up in an undesirable
equilibrium, both unable to decrease local conflict and
unable to attract investment (e.g. Collier, 2006; Buss-
mann, 2010). The contribution of international invest-
ment to such a conflict trap, however, rests on the precise
way in which investors turn away local conflict.
In this article, we study the impact of terrorism on
international merger and acquisitions decisions (the
majority of FDI decisions; Antras & Yeaple, 2014;
Davies, Desbordes & Ray, 2016) of a large set of firms.
Hence, we add to the literature that studies effects of
terrorism on international investment flows, which by and
large takes a national perspective. It generally documents
negative impacts of terrorism, although the estimated sen-
sitivity varies (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Enders &
Sandler, 1996; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas,
2014; Enders, Sachsida & Sandler, 2006). There are two
arguments for focusing on firm-level decisions.
First, the firm-level analysis allows us to compare the
investment decisions of the same firm for different loca-
tions. Thus, we keep the characteristics of the firm – the
supply side of the decision – constant in the analysis. This
approach rules out that firm differences in, for example,
ability, quality of management, control, risk appetite, or
the need for resources from terrorism-affected countries
explain the relation we find between terrorism and invest-
ment decisions (Chen & Moore, 2010; Yeaple, 2013;
Witte et al., 2017). We show that failing to control for
firm-specific characteristics (as an analysis of nationally
aggregated flows would) yields results that may under-
or overstate the investment sensitivity to host country
terrorism. Our results suggest that a sample standard
deviation in terrorism leads to around 30% lower
expected investment. That is in line with the literature,
which puts the number between 10 and 50%.
Second, the firm-level analysis provides a closer pic-
ture of the dynamics by which firms adapt their entry
strategies. Our results imply that when faced with terror-
ism, firms might decide not to enter at a country at all
(i.e. they adapt through the ‘extensive margin’). The
evidence for adjustments of the size of investments, the
‘intensive margin’, is far less convincing. Arguably,
investment adjustment along the extensive margin rather
than the intensive margin is more dramatic, because
extensive margin adjustment may lead to loss of technol-
ogy and supply chains, tends to increase host country
volatility, and complicates recovery of investments (Ber-
gin, Feenstra & Hanson, 2009; Bernard et al., 2009).
Moreover, we investigate what forms of terrorism most
evidently discourage firm entry. In contrast to related
literature (Powers & Choi, 2012), we find that terrorism
that targets businesses is not significantly more or less
discouraging than other forms of terrorism. Nor do
attacks on local firms’ assets have stronger impact than
other types of attacks. That suggests that indirect adver-
sities of terrorism, such as logistical disruptions or a
paralyzed business environment, may be as important
as the risk of direct damages.
The next sections briefly review theories of multina-
tional entry strategies in light of host countries’ terrorism,
before discussing the data, methodology, and results.
Conceptual framework
Terrorism has come to play a big role in economic deci-
sions, including the location choices of people,
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organizations, and businesses. Terrorism is often defined
as ‘the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal
violence or brutality by individuals or subnational groups
to obtain a political, religious, social, or ideological
objective through intimidation of a large audience, usu-
ally not directly involved with the decision making’
(Enders & Sandler, 2012: 3, among others). Terrorist
acts are on the rise worldwide and they are increasingly
targeted at businesses (LaFree, Dugan & Miller, 2014;
Brandt & Sandler, 2010). Moreover, firms’ location
choices are surprisingly sensitive to terrorist activity,
compared to other risks with similar damages (Abadie
& Gardeabazal, 2008; Blomberg & Mody, 2005). Alto-
gether, this suggests that terrorism has increasingly large
impacts on the allocation of multinational enterprises
across countries.
In our analysis, we explore two dimensions of the
impact of terrorism on firm location choices – a context
is sketched below. First, we question what types of ter-
rorism firms fear: hostility towards businesses (implying
that their assets are in the line of fire), or general terrorist
attacks, including those targeting governments or civi-
lians, that cause turmoil such as depressed demand and
an uncertain environment. Second, we explore how
firms adjust their investment after terrorist attacks: by
scaling down the size of the investment, or by deciding to
withhold the investment entirely.
Firms’ fear of host-market terrorism: Local assets at risk or
a local market at risk?
Multinationals can be discouraged directly by terrorist
hostility: the risk of becoming a terrorist target. Applying
the Dunning ‘ownership, location and internalization’
(OLI) framework, as in Powers & Choi (2012), owner-
ship has direct disadvantages in countries where terrorism
targets businesses. Local assets may be in the ‘line of fire’,
with higher probability of being destroyed or damaged
(Li, Tallman & Ferreira, 2005; Sandler & Enders,
2008; Fielding, 2004). An increased likelihood of being
targeted risks the value of local buildings, machinery,
products, personnel, and brand value (Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2011; Spich & Grosse, 2005; Czinkota et al.,
2010; Powers & Choi, 2012). Drawing on economic
theories of multinational investment (Barba Navaretti &
Venables, 2006), the risk of damage to host-country
plants and (human) capital directly reduces the profitabil-
ity of the international investment decision. A firm’s assets
and resources are not limited to the items on its balance
sheet: the risk extends to upstream and downstream sup-
pliers and the supply chain, its data infrastructure, and its
local transport networks (Li, Tallman & Ferreira, 2005;
Sheffi, 2001). The costs of operations in a prospective
location are likely to go up, too. Wages of employees at
firms likely to be targeted by terrorism tend to be higher
(Frey, Luechinger & Stutzer, 2007), and insurance pre-
miums significantly increase after terrorist attacks, partic-
ularly for targetable buildings and structures (Lenain,
Bonturi & Koen, 2002). Firms also tend to spend more
on securing their sites and staff (Gaibulloev & Sandler,
2011). Recent evidence additionally shows that the threat
of terrorist attacks on a firm stresses its employees to such
extents that performance substantially declines (Bader,
Berg & Holtbru¨gge, 2015).
However, terrorist attacks, even if they do not target
firms directly, deteriorate the circumstances for opera-
tions in the host country in general. Hence, the indirect
impacts of host country terrorism on multinationals may
be substantial, too. The indirect channel of discourage-
ment operates differently from the direct terrorist threats
to local assets. Terrorist attacks in general could be con-
sidered as locational disadvantages in the OLI framework
(Powers & Choi, 2012). Firms pay risk premia in wages
and real estate prices, even if they are not targeted
directly (Abadie & Dermisi, 2008). Similarly, high levels
of overall terrorism tend to damage local infrastructure,
frustrating the distribution networks of firms as a side-
effect. The rise of terrorism coincides with problems in
transactions and contracting, forming a barrier to
exploiting local opportunities for sourcing, selling, and
partnering (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2011). Governments tend to tighten policy and
regulations, complicating the business environment
(Czinkota et al., 2010). Terrorist attacks can also shock
the (local) economy, leading to lower economic perfor-
mance and demand, and redirecting government bud-
gets (e.g. Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2008). Standard economic theories of FDI
mostly interpret such indirect impacts as a reduction in
effective market size, leading to lower host-market
expenditure (Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2006). For
horizontally motivated (market-supplying) investments,
that implies that the potential returns to an international
investment decline with terrorism. For vertically moti-
vated investment seeking low-cost production locations,
market size is less important and the corresponding
reductions in wages might even encourage investment,
provided that contract, legal, and logistical frictions do
not outweigh the labor cost reductions. For multina-
tionals, operations in a location associated with terrorism
or conflict may also come with reputational damages and
issues of legitimacy (Driffield, Jones & Crotty, 2013).
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Pressure from press or consumers in and outside the host
country may convince multinationals to exit. The
mechanisms listed so far suggest that terrorism dis-
courages firm entry, but some theories suggest that gen-
eral terrorism (not targeted at individual firms) offers
investment opportunities. The ownership decision in the
OLI paradigm might favor investment when terrorism
rises, because firms wish to exert more control (Li, Tall-
man & Ferreira, 2005 – the ownership decisions contra-
dict the locational decision).2 In recent trade theories,
multinationals are better equipped to deal with uncertain
environments. For instance, multinationals tend to have
higher productivities, profit margins, and resilience, so
they may be more likely to survive shocks, relative to
weakened local competition in affected areas (Mayer &
Ottaviano, 2008). Similarly, multinationals are more
likely to possess useful experience from operations in
other conflict locations (Li, Tallman & Ferreira,
2005). Moreover, times of terror may erode the ties of
incumbent firms to the political establishment or free up
the natural resources of the country, both of which favor
multinationals over domestic firms (Witte et al., 2017;
Guidolin & La Ferrara, 2007). Or, on occasion, multi-
national firms may see opportunities that stem directly
from conflict in outright ‘follow the flag strategies’
(Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007).
Compared to domestic firms, multinational firms
might more easily deal with threats of terrorism to their
local assets. Multinationals are the largest, most produc-
tive firms, best equipped to deal with difficult markets
(Chen &Moore, 2010) with more resources and market
power. They are also more likely to organize their secu-
rity privately, in particular in countries where police ser-
vices or property rights are imperfect. Moreover,
multinational firms have a limited exposure to the
affected market, relative to firms that only operate in the
affected country (Li, Tallman & Ferreira, 2005). Thus,
multinationals might have a competitive advantage in
maintaining operations or access to credit relative to local
firms when businesses are under threat. Following these
arguments, multinationals may have more control than
local firms over the potential damages when facing
terrorism that is hostile particularly to the firm. As a
consequence, multinationals may perform well in
terrorism-affected areas compared to local firms. On the
other hand, multinational firms may be more likely
targets of business-related terrorism, particularly if their
operations are controversial, if they have low levels of
legitimacy, or if terrorism is driven by nationalist
motives, for instance (Driffield, Jones & Crotty, 2013).
Hence, whether multinationals respond more
strongly to business-targeting terrorism than to other
forms of terrorism is up for discussion. We examine this
question in our empirical strategy. The article most
closely related on this point, Powers & Choi (2012),
takes up this question in nationally aggregated data,
using another source of terrorism data. They document
that international investment flows are particularly sen-
sitive to terrorist attacks that have explicit business tar-
gets, while they are far less sensitive to terrorism with
other targets. Enders, Sachsida & Sandler (2006) raise
this possibility to explain the difference between their
results and those of Enders & Sandler (1996).
Entry decisions and scale decisions
There are several ways in which multinationals can
adjust their international investment decisions in the face
of terrorism. They may withhold their investments
entirely (the ‘extensive margin’) or adjust the size of their
investments (the ‘intensive margin’). Understanding
these margins of adjustment is relevant for several rea-
sons. First, they inform policies to ameliorate the impacts
of terrorism. If firms scale down but remain present
following terrorist attacks, policymakers may support
their economy with efforts to reduce costs or other firm
burdens, or prop up demand. The complete withdrawal
of investment (extensive margin adjustment), on the
other hand, may point to unfathomable barriers to local
operations, in the face of which local policymakers are
probably powerless. Second, extensive margin adjust-
ments change the firm population of a country more
dramatically, especially given the fact that most invest-
ment and employment by international firms is
accounted for by a few ‘superstar firms’ (Mayer & Otta-
viano, 2008). Firms leaving the country, instead of
downscaling their investment, leads to graver conse-
quences in the variety of foreign technologies brought
into the country, making it more likely that the country
drops out of a supply chain altogether and leading to
geographically concentrated employment losses in the
areas they leave behind. Evidence from trade patterns
suggests, moreover, that the recovery of investment by
attracting new firms is more difficult than recovering the
pre-existing relations (Bernard et al., 2009). Third,
adjustments of international investment along the exter-
nal margin lead to more volatility in the economy and
2 Or, following trade theories (Chen & Moore, 2010), firms may
change production locations and supply through exports, in
particular for horizontal (market-seeking) investments.
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employment in the host country than do adjustments on
the internal margin (Bergin, Feenstra & Hanson, 2009),
so that the macroeconomic consequences of extensive
margin adjustment are more severe.
Theories of international firms suggest that the choice
ofwhether to invest in a country differs materially from the
decision how much to invest. Consequently, terrorismmay
have different impacts on the two decisions. Most theories
of multinational firms accept that substantial investment
in local (fixed) assets is required to operate in a country. If
assets such as buildings, machinery, and knowledge are
exposed to terrorism, marginal adjustments to the size of
production barely limit the firm’s exposure – but exiting
the country would (Buch et al., 2009). Similarly, being
associated with violence and terrorism may damage firms’
reputations and legitimacy irrespective of their size – as
does corruption, for instance (Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck &
Eden, 2005). In recent trade theories of trade and invest-
ment (Chen &Moore, 2010), the most capable firms sort
into difficult locations, and under adversities like terror-
ism, the least able drop out. According to these theories,
most adjustment would be through firm entry and exit (a
parallel mechanism is outlined for trade and terrorism in
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2018). Trade and
investment theories might predict an adjustment along
the intensive margin too, but generally only if terrorism
affects per-unit costs of production, rather than fixed
assets like buildings or infrastructure. In more business-
oriented models of firms, that study internationalization
by stages, the entry decision differs from the decision on
investment size, too (Delios & Henisz, 2003). Firms may
‘test the water’ – they enter a country with limited expo-
sure to see if they can handle difficult, uncertain or violent
environments. Only in a later stage does the choice for
optimal scale take place. Following that interpretation,
terrorism may drive out the firms that are testing the
environment, but it has less impact on the operations of
firms that have learned to deal with uncertainty in the host
country.
Terrorism is more likely to affect the extensive margin
than the intensive margin, following these theories.
Much of the firm’s exposure in terms of local assets,
reputation, and legitimacy is tied to their presence, rather
than to the size of their local investment. Moreover,
multinationals that mastered the management of uncer-
tainty in the host country might be less likely to leave
after attacks. The argument for intensive margin adjust-
ment is somewhat less obvious, as the decision on the
firm’s operational size is less obviously connected to the
risks of terrorism. An empirical analysis of these margins
of adjustment has not been done for multinational
investments, to our knowledge. On this point, related
analyses focus on nationally aggregated flows of invest-
ment, which cannot distinguish between the external
and internal margin of adjustment.
Empirical strategy
To establish whether terrorist attacks reduce mergers and
acquisitions (M&As), our analysis explains investment
decisions by international firms from the number of ter-
rorist attacks in the potential host country. We focus on
M&As for several reasons. First, M&As account for the
larger shares of direct international capital flows, making it
the most representative type of FDI. Second, M&As
closely measure responses of firms. Firms may be sluggish
to invest or divest their existing stock following incidents,
and their book values may differ from the physical capital
or operations in the country. Focusing on the presence or
absence of big acquisitions between parties minimizes
these concerns. Third, accurate numbers of firms’ capital
stocks of location are scarcer, so that data on mergers and
acquisitions provide a more comprehensive dataset.
Our empirical analysis explains a firm’s investment
decision in a particular location from proxies of terrorist
activity in that location. This shows whether terrorist
incidents are significantly associated with lower invest-
ment values or probabilities. As these are bilateral
observations (from every firm to every potential loca-
tion), the regression equation is reminiscent of a stan-
dard gravity model:
lnMAict ¼ bTerrorct þ gXict þ it þ eict : ð1Þ
In this equation, ln MAict refers to log investment of
firm i in country c at time t through a merger or acquisi-
tion. The variable Terrorct represents terrorist activities in
country c preceding the investment choice. Xict refers to
set of controls, it is a firm-year fixed effect, and eict is an
IID error term. The coefficient of interest here is b, which
measures the association of terrorist activities with (log)
merger and acquisition value decisions. The setup of this
model is similar in spirit toWitte et al. (2017) andOuyang
& Rajan (2017), though we measure outcomes at the level
of the investing firm, rather than the origin country.
We use firm-year fixed effects to focus on variation
across destinations within investment decisions for the
same firm. A merger or acquisition can be considered a
result of the supply of assets in the host country, and the
demand for such assets by international firms. Terrorism
may reduce the effective supply of assets, or make them
less appealing. The fixed effects approach focuses on the
shocks originating from the host market, as we compare
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investment flows across host markets for the same firm in
the same year. Consequently, we do not infer whether
overall investment was lower or higher for individual
countries, but we compare whether one country receives
more or less investment than the other country from the
same firm, given that one country experiences more ter-
rorism than the other.
As we do not cover the population of firms or coun-
tries, the fixed effects structure may also correct for an
unobserved variable bias. If covðTerrorct ; eictÞ 6¼ 0, the
coefficient for terrorist activity obtained in Equation
(1) is biased when using a regular OLS regression. Such
a bias is plausible, for instance if risky firms sort in
particular destinations, or if firm size leads both to overall
elevated demand for foreign assets and to better ability to
overcome obstacles like terrorism. Using fixed effects at
the firm-year level, we control for the firm-specific
shocks and firm sorting that might influence our esti-
mate of the impact of terrorism.
The decision to invest is associated with a lot of zeros,
as firms engage in mergers or acquisitions in at most a few
countries at a time. We deal with a high share of zeros
using two strategies. First, we estimate a Poisson model,
incorporating zero-outcomes in the log-form regression.
Effectively, we estimate MAict ¼ ebTerrorct egXict uict , so that
we recover the standard gravity interpretation with zero
flows included (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).
Second, we split the investment decision into an
extensive margin (entry) and an intensive margin (the
quantity of investment). The split unearths the dynamics
that comprise the aggregate flow. To see this, we write
the aggregated flow of mergers and acquisition value of
country j into country c as:
MAjct ¼ Njt  PðentryÞjct  ½MAict jentry ¼ 1; ð2Þ
where Njt is the total number of firms in country j.
PðentryÞjct is the entry probability of firms in country j
into country c, and MAict jentry ¼ 1 is the average value
of the investment, conditional on entry. Assuming that
terrorism in country c does not affect the number of
firms in the origin country j, the relative change (denoted
by a hat) in the total M&A flow is:
dMAjct ¼ dPðentryÞjct þ dMAict jentry¼1: ð3Þ
Given our firm-level approach, we can estimate the
two margins separately.
Data and controls
Our data on mergers and acquisitions are from Bureau
van Dijk’s Zephyr database. We focus on firms
completing deals of at least one million dollars in a
cross-border merger or acquisition in the years 2000 to
2015. If a firm has multiple investments in a country in a
given year, we use the sum of the value of those invest-
ments. The dataset comprises observations on 8,872
investing firms in 116 host countries (the list of countries
is in Online appendix OA1).
The data on terrorist events are from the Global Ter-
rorism Database (GTD, 2016). We use observations for
which three criteria for a classification as terrorism
are satisfied: (1) The incident must be intentional; (2) the
incident must entail some level of violence or immediate
threat of violence; (3) the perpetrators of the incidents
must be subnational actors. Moreover, we exclude obser-
vations for which the terrorist motive is doubted. We
also split these according to whether the target was a
business (patron) or not. If the target was a business,
we also split these events by whether the attack type was
personal (assassination or assault against people associ-
ated with the business), on physical assets (facility or
infrastructure attack or vehicle hijack) or indiscriminate
(bombing/explosions, assault, or hostage taking not
directly involving business facilities or employees).
For our proxy of terrorist activity, we use the number
of attacks in a country. We scale the number of attacks to
the population of the country (from the WDI world
governance indicators). The literature is divided over this
choice (Ouyang & Rajan, 2017; Bandyopadhyay, Sand-
ler & Younas, 2014; Powers & Choi, 2012). Our prior is
that the attacks per capita better reflect the probability of
being affected by an attack for a given firm – a single
attack may have comparatively lower impact in Nigeria
than in Burundi.3 The strategy is confirmed in the data:
in the preferred specifications, the absolute number of
attacks has no explanatory power conditional on the
number of attacks per capita. The number of attacks per
capita is highly skewed, so we exclude observations with
over 50 attacks per million inhabitants.4 We use the
number of attacks in the year preceding the investment,
to avoid attributing investment behavior to terrorist
attacks that occurred in the same year, but later than the
3 One might argue that terrorist attacks have limited spatial effects.
For larger countries, some regions may be risky, while other regions
are considered safe. Hence, the attack number may overstate gravity
for larger countries (in particular when it is not scaled to country size),
and we may be underreporting the impact of terrorism at small spatial
scales.
4 The observations are a few years in Libya and Iraq – leaving these in
the sample has very limited influence on the baseline (firm-level)
analysis, but larger impact on the nationally aggregated analysis.
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investment decision. A sensitivity to check for this choice
is discussed in the Results section.
Terrorist attacks have risen over the course of our
sample, from 0.2 to 1.2 per million inhabitants. The
standard deviation across the sample is just over three
attacks per million inhabitants. Business-targeting terror-
ism has remained more stable (it rose from 0.03 to 0.10
attacks per million inhabitants, the standard deviation is
0.06) and varied between 9% and 21% over the years.
The number of business attacks correlates strongly (0.84)
to the overall number of attacks.
Terrorist attacks may correlate to other characteristics
of the host country, which could also explain investment
behavior. We include a set of controls to rule out con-
founding explanations conventional to the literature (Di
Giovanni, 2005; Ouyang & Rajan, 2017; Powers &
Choi, 2012; Wang, 2008). To control for the level of
development that might confound with terrorist activity,
we include GDP and GDP per capita measures of the
host. To account for the fact that terrorism might be less
discouraging to firms located close to the host country,
we consider common gravity variables from articles
explaining international mergers and acquisitions
(Ouyang & Rajan, 2017; Erel, Liao & Weisbach,
2012; Di Giovanni, 2005). They include bilateral dis-
tances weighted by population, indicators for common
language, colonial relationship, common religion, from
the CEPII. We also incorporate the real effective
exchange rate (from Darvas, 2012) and the exchange rate
volatility, calculated according to Di Giovanni (2005).
We include the trade openness (import and export over
GDP) to control for the ease of shipment.
Several political developments may correlate with
entry decisions and terrorism, obscuring the cause-and-
effect relation. To ascertain that these do not explain our
results, we control for several aspects of (confounding)
host country investment climate. We include governance
indicators controlling for corruption, quality of govern-
ment, political representation, rule of law, and regulatory
quality (from the WDI world governance indicators).
We exclude absence of violence for its obvious overlap
with the terrorism variable. At times, terrorism may lead
to overthrow of government, and an associated policy
change toward multinational firms. We control for
regime transitions as identified by the Polity 4 dataset
(Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2017). Terrorism may also be
associated with violent conflict in general, so that terror-
ist attacks conflate with overall violence. We control for
battle-related deaths in the host country taken from the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Petterson &
Eck, 2018) to rule out that violent conflict in general
explains our results. Descriptive statistics for the firm-
level sample are in Online appendix AO2.
Results
Impacts on overall investment
The first column of Table I reports the Poisson estimates
of the effects of the number of terrorist attacks on merger
and acquisition flows without controls or fixed effects.
The Poisson count model has a gravity interpretation,
suggesting that one extra terrorist attack per million
inhabitants is linked to a 12% decrease in value of merg-
ers and acquisitions. As terrorist attacks are generally rare
(the number per capita is typically low), we also report
the effect of an increase in terrorist attacks of one sample
standard deviation on the relative change in investment
(the log difference in the M&A flow). A one sample
standard deviation increase in terrorism is associated with
a decline of 31% in the expected investment flow, with a
standard error of 9%.
Column 2 of Table I reports the same regression,
adding terrorist attacks directed against businesses. The
coefficient is larger, suggesting that one extra attack per
million inhabitants reduces the investment flow by
around 78%, which is a larger impact than the general
attacks. Business attacks are rare, however, and one sam-
ple standard deviation in attacks leads to less impact: a
20% reduction in the flow.
Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates with firm-year
specific effects. Effectively, the variation exploited here is
from comparisons of the same firm in the same year,
observing investment decisions in multiple locations.
The regression thus controls for the supply of funds from
the firms, isolating host country-specific drivers of the
M&A flow of firms. That increases the magnitude of the
estimated impact by about 15%.
Columns 5 and 6 additionally introduce controls.
These do little to change the estimates for the overall
level of attack, and yield a slightly more pronounced
coefficient for business attacks. The controls are largely
in line with expectations, although correlation within
the controls can complicate the interpretation.5 The
association of investments with trade openness is neg-
ative conditional on the other controls – possibly trade
5 Adding log GDP and log GDP per capita implicitly introduces log
population as a linear combination of the two, so that any variation
deriving from these three is controlled for, despite a less obvious
interpretation. A classical gravity approach (using only log GDP)
yields the expected signs on the controls.
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impediments may also form a motivation for (horizon-
tal) FDI.
The model of column 7 nests business-targeting
attacks per capita with the sum of all other attacks. The
coefficients of both variables are estimated with larger
standard errors, possibly because of the correlation
between the number of business-targeting attacks and
other attacks. The coefficient for business-targeting
attacks falls substantially compared to column 6, while
the coefficient for other attacks is somewhat smaller
than the coefficient for the sum of attacks reported in
column 5. As both variables are measured on the same
Table I. Impacts on expected investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Attacks/cap. –0.121*** –0.138*** –0.138**
(0.0438) (0.0522) (0.0643)
Business attacks/cap. –0.782*** –0.863*** –0.985** –0.453
(0.261) (0.315) (0.413) (0.488)
Non-business –0.108
attacks/cap. (0.0787)
log GDP –0.202*** –0.204*** –0.203***
(0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0629)
log GDP/cap. 0.262*** 0.266*** 0.261***
(0.0951) (0.0973) (0.0955)
log Distance –0.455*** –0.452*** –0.455***
(0.0717) (0.0723) (0.0717)
Common language 0.400* 0.400* 0.399*
(0.208) (0.210) (0.208)
Colonial tie 0.992** 0.980** 0.989**
(0.406) (0.408) (0.409)
Common religion 0.760** 0.791** 0.762**
(0.326) (0.326) (0.326)
Real exchange rate –0.00405 –0.00340 –0.00384
(0.00634) (0.00637) (0.00632)
Exchange rate vol. –6.143* –6.449* –6.261*
(3.286) (3.338) (3.337)
Regulatory quality 3.755*** 3.830*** 3.770***
(0.671) (0.681) (0.670)
Rule of law –0.102 –0.134 –0.115
(0.577) (0.579) (0.573)
Control of corruption –1.505*** –1.478*** –1.508***
(0.526) (0.538) (0.529)
Voice and acct. –0.521 –0.432 –0.495
(0.563) (0.563) (0.567)
Govt effectiveness 4.284*** 4.162*** 4.263***
(0.731) (0.710) (0.726)
Polity transition 0.254 0.261 0.252
(0.276) (0.275) (0.275)
Battle-related deaths/cap. –0.00831 –0.0133** –0.00886
(0.00522) (0.00592) (0.00555)
Trade openness –1.329* –1.350** –1.335*
(0.682) (0.687) (0.689)
Observations 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572
Firm-year FE no no yes yes yes yes yes
SD impact –0.312 –0.196 –0.348 –0.214 –0.348 –0.241 –0.241
se 0.0936 0.0587 0.106 0.0692 0.130 0.0876 0.0876
Estimations from a Poisson model. Dependent variable is the level of investment. Standard errors clustered at the host-country-year level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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scale, we use a Wald test for the equality of the two
coefficients which does not reject (p ¼ 0.77), suggest-
ing that the coefficients of business-targeting and
non-business-targeting terrorism on investment do not
differ significantly.
Do the estimates reportedhere differ froman analysis on
aggregate, country-level flows of mergers and acquisitions?
To investigate the differences, we aggregated ourmicrodata
by origin-destination country pair and year, and ran the
same regressions at the country-level. The results are
reported inTable IV inAppendixA.The estimateswithout
fixed effects or controls provide a similar coefficient to the
micro-level estimates. With home country-year fixed
effects, the nationally aggregated data suggest far stronger
impacts than the micro-level data. That difference shrinks
when controls are added, with the estimated impact in the
national data now 30% smaller than in the microdata.
Entry decisions: Intensive and extensive and intensive
margin
To estimate the impact of terrorism on the extensive
margin, we use the selection into M&A in a host country
– a dichotomous variable – as the dependent variable and
repeat the same analysis.
Given the intensive fixed effects structure, we opt for a
linear probability model over a logit model. This choice
makes different assumptions about the underlying dis-
tribution of the error term, and about the theoretical
assumption whether the dependent variable could be
outside the 0 to 1 range. For the regressions reported
below, the linear probability model predicts outside the
range of 0 to 1 for less than 10% of the cases. For the
intensive margin, we restrict the sample to observed
investments. We regress the log of the invested sum on
measures of terrorist activity.
Columns 1–3 of Table II report the results of regres-
sions on the entry decision. The OLS model shows
negative significant effects of both general and business-
targeting terrorist attacks on the likelihood of entry. As
entry is a rare event, we report the relative change in entry
probability if the terrorism measure increases by one stan-
dard deviation: it is –8% for general attacks and –7% for
business-targeting attacks. Nesting the count of attacks
per capita targeting business with the count of other
attacks (in column 3) and testing the coefficient equiva-
lence with a Wald test again suggest no significant differ-
ences in their impact on the entry decision.
The intensivemargin decision is reflected in columns 4–
6. They show no significant impact of any of the measures
of terrorism on the size of the investment. This also occurs
in the (unreported) specification with no fixed effects and
controls. Moreover, other determinants, like institutional
quality measures, do affect the investment size. Hence it
seems that conditional on investing, firms hardly adjust the
size of their investment to terrorist activity.6
The extensive margin impact at sample averages seems
smaller than the combined margin model suggests in
Table II. By Equation (2), given that intensive margins
do not adjust, one might expect relative changes in the
extensive margin to equal the overall margin. That
expectation only holds, however, if the entry probability
and the size of potential investment are uncorrelated
across destinations. A likely explanation for this differ-
ence is that terrorism deters entry more strongly in des-
tinations where large investments would be expected
(note that the Poisson model and the extensive margin
model use the same sample and covariates).
Impact by business targets
A finding in contrast to earlier results (Powers & Choi,
2012) is that business attacks seem to have no different
impacts, compared to other attacks. From the arguments
surveyed in the literature review, one might expect the
two impacts to differ. The risk of direct damages to local
assets possibly plays a different role in firm decisions than
the more indirect risk of poorer business climate or soci-
etal disruption, such as logistical problems.
The GTD, the source of terrorism data, allows further
data disaggregation related to these mechanisms. In addi-
tion to the targeted party, it records the object or persons
threatened to generate leverage, including a firm’s build-
ing or staff. To see if firms fear direct attacks on their
physical assets or personnel, we split up business-
targeting attacks into (i) those directed at people
(assassinations and assault), (ii) physical assets (facility,
infrastructure, and vehicle hijackings), and (iii) indirect
attacks – attacks that aim to terrorize businesses, but do
not directly target their possessions or staff.
Table III shows the results of our preferred regressions
when splitting business-targeting attacks per capita in
this manner. The only significant impact is on the exten-
sive margins, and strikingly, only indirect attacks have a
negative impact, while personnel attacks have a positive
6 Estimates at the intensive margin with firm-year fixed effects come
with a particular sample selection: only firms investing in at least two
locations are included. When not including fixed effects, and using all
observations with positive investments, the impact of terrorism
variables remains insignificant. Estimating the extensive margin
model for the firms with at least two investment locations shows
results that are very comparable to the larger sample.
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impact. The coefficient of personnel impact needs to be
interpreted conditional on the other, correlated, attacks,
which may explain why it is positive. A similar pattern
appears in the combined margin (column 1), but the
coefficients are insignificant.
These results suggest that when splitting up business-
targeting effects, international investments are not par-
ticularly sensitive to the risk of damages to property and
personnel. Instead, the entry decision seems more sensi-
tive to attacks on related parties or bystanders.
Table II. Effect on entry decision
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Entry log Investment
Attacks/cap. –0.000240*** –0.0149
(8.31e–05) (0.0289)
Business attacks/cap. –0.00230*** –0.000641 –0.542 –0.971
(0.000823) (0.00137) (0.479) (0.752)
Non-business attacks/cap. –0.000207 0.0635
(0.000141) (0.0542)
log GDP –0.00134*** –0.00134*** –0.00134*** –0.0865* –0.0868* –0.0876*
(0.000511) (0.000511) (0.000511) (0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0455)
log GDP/cap. 0.000900** 0.000906** 0.000899** 0.0753 0.0720 0.0737
(0.000375) (0.000375) (0.000375) (0.0836) (0.0829) (0.0830)
log Distance –0.00919*** –0.00918*** –0.00919*** –0.0164 –0.0214 –0.0210
(0.000470) (0.000470) (0.000470) (0.0621) (0.0626) (0.0626)
Common language 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0146*** –0.0549 –0.0633 –0.0745
(0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.159) (0.158) (0.156)
Colonial tie 0.0100*** 0.00999*** 0.0100*** 0.113 0.120 0.120
(0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00168) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
Common religion 0.00514*** 0.00515*** 0.00513*** –0.250 –0.255 –0.248
(0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00139) (0.293) (0.293) (0.293)
Real exchange rate –1.22e–05 –1.19e–05 –1.22e–05 0.00611 0.00630 0.00626
(2.61e–05) (2.62e–05) (2.61e–05) (0.00584) (0.00584) (0.00587)
Exchange rate vol. –0.00261 –0.00299 –0.00263 –1.403 –1.512 –1.553
(0.00450) (0.00450) (0.00450) (1.681) (1.684) (1.688)
Regulatory quality 0.0161*** 0.0160*** 0.0161*** 0.636 0.618 0.643
(0.00336) (0.00335) (0.00336) (0.561) (0.563) (0.561)
Rule of law –0.00213 –0.00217 –0.00215 –0.413 –0.440 –0.469
(0.00224) (0.00224) (0.00224) (0.519) (0.524) (0.529)
Control of corruption 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 0.0123*** 1.167** 1.170** 1.204**
(0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00315) (0.526) (0.527) (0.532)
Voice and acct. –0.0108*** –0.0106*** –0.0108*** –0.545 –0.571 –0.558
(0.00297) (0.00296) (0.00297) (0.546) (0.546) (0.547)
Govt effectiveness 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.981* 0.998* 0.969*
(0.00286) (0.00287) (0.00287) (0.559) (0.555) (0.557)
Polity transition –0.00138 –0.00138 –0.00138 0.262 0.256 0.258
(0.00160) (0.00160) (0.00160) (0.328) (0.324) (0.324)
Battle related deaths/cap. –2.87e–05** –3.23e–05** –2.89e–05** 0.00861 0.00960 0.00887
(1.33e–05) (1.37e–05) (1.33e–05) (0.00613) (0.00618) (0.00616)
Trade openness –0.0105*** –0.0105*** –0.0105*** –0.201** –0.207** –0.209**
(0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.0965) (0.0975) (0.0978)
Observations 1,136,572 1,136,572 1,136,572 3,333 3,333 3,333
Firm-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
SD impact –0.0800 –0.0688 –0.0151 –0.0589
se 0.0277 0.0247 0.0294 0.0521
Estimates by OLS. Standard errors clustered at the host-country-year level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Robustness
We use the rest of this section to discuss the stability of
our baseline results with respect to modeling choices. For
reasons of space, we discuss the diagnostics and leave the
detailed results in an Online appendix.
First, there is a large number of zeros for firm-specific
destination years. The zero outcome might occur because
investment is entirely unlikely for some combinations of
firms and host countries, or because unobserved motiva-
tions drive the selection into a positive number. To
account for potential excess zeros, we employed a zero-
inflated Poisson model on the same data. The results for
that model are very similar. Moreover, using an HPC test7
(Silva, Tenreyro & Windmeijer, 2015), we find no evi-
dence that the zero-inflated model statistically outper-
forms the regular Poisson model.
Second, the baseline specification employs the number
of terrorist attacks in the year preceding the investment.
To check if investment responds more sensitively to con-
temporaneous attacks or possible expectations of attacks,
we introduce the contemporaneous attacks and the num-
ber of attacks in the year following the investment. A
second motive to check sensitivity to future attacks is as
an informal check of unobserved variables. If firms
respond to unobserved trends or variables relating to the
host country development that correlates with attacks,
onemight expect the future values of attacks – conditional
on current attacks – to show up as significant. Table OA3
in the Online appendix introduces the lagged, contem-
poraneous, and one-year forward number of attacks. The
coefficient for the number of contemporaneous attacks is
negative (at about half the size of the lagged number
attacks) but insignificant. This is consistent with the pos-
sibility that for an investment in a given year, a substantial
number of attacks registered that same year after the
investment takes place. Introducing the one-year forward
number of attack (columns 3 and 4) yields an insignificant
coefficient close to zero for the impact of future attacks.
Third, we report the number of attacks as our pre-
ferred measure of terrorist activity. One might argue that
the impact of the attacks is better measured by the
wounds and deaths they inflict. The number of casualties
might better measure the social impact of the attack, as
well as the scale and complexity of the operations. On
the other hand, many attacks, in particular those targeted
at businesses, may not intend to cause casualties at all,
but rather physical or reputational damage.






Estimator Poisson OLS OLS










log GDP –0.203*** –0.00150*** –0.0861*
(0.0632) (0.000567) (0.0454)
log GDP/cap. 0.258*** 0.000936** 0.0788
(0.0954) (0.000418) (0.0840)
log Distance –0.453*** –0.0101*** –0.0162
(0.0720) (0.000521) (0.0625)
Common language 0.398* 0.0162*** –0.0715
(0.210) (0.00166) (0.159)
Colonial tie 0.985** 0.0104*** 0.126
(0.404) (0.00178) (0.177)
Common religion 0.773** 0.00491*** –0.251
(0.325) (0.00151) (0.293)
Real exchange rate –0.00389 –1.82e–05 0.00606
(0.00627) (2.92e–05) (0.00584)
Exchange rate vol. –6.070* –0.00127 –1.405
(3.293) (0.00489) (1.679)
Regulatory quality 3.803*** 0.0180*** 0.650
(0.685) (0.00376) (0.562)
Rule of law –0.0628 –0.00221 –0.445
(0.571) (0.00250) (0.515)
Control of corruption –1.534*** 0.0130*** 1.219**
(0.530) (0.00349) (0.524)
Voice and acct. –0.524 –0.0128*** –0.541
(0.563) (0.00336) (0.547)
Govt effectiveness 4.277*** 0.0232*** 0.962*
(0.735) (0.00324) (0.562)






Trade openness –1.317* –0.0116*** –0.203**
(0.686) (0.00146) (0.0966)
Observations 1,136,572 1,136,572 3,333
Firm-year FE yes yes yes
Standard errors clustered at the host-country-year level. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
7 This is a heteroskedasticity-robust P and C test, which tests an
artificial regression explaining the residuals of one model from the
predicted dependent variable of the linearized estimated version of
that model, and the difference in predicted values from the two
models.
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To test for this difference, we have added measures of
the number of killed and wounded to our baseline regres-
sions, in addition to the simple count of attacks. Table
OA4 in the Online appendix reports the results. Both on
the combined margin and on the extensive margin, the
number of attacks has a significant negative impact, while
the number of killed and wounded has a positive impact.
These estimates need to be interpreted keeping in mind
the correlation between the two – the number of casualties
in a country does not generally increase the likelihood of
entry, because they imply a larger number of attacks,
which reduces the likelihood of entry. We find no signif-
icant results for the intensive margin. Altogether, this
suggests that the casualty number is not a better measure
of deterring force than the number of attacks.
Fourth, we check the logged version of the number of
attacks per capita. While this offers benefits in interpreta-
tion and possibly in functional fit, a major downside is that
it causes sample selection: countries without attacks are
dropped from the sample.TableOA5 in theOnline appen-
dix reports the results for the logged measures of terrorism.
The results are fairly similar – there are negative impacts on
the combined margin and the extensive margin, and the
impacts of a sample standard deviation change are compa-
rable. On the extensive margin, the impact of a one stan-
dard deviation increase in terrorism is stronger when
estimating in logs. This is not due to sample selection –
in the same sample, the standard deviation impact is
around –10%, in line with earlier results. Given the sample
losses, we report level impacts, but the impact along the
extensive margin may be slightly stronger when measured
in logs, in fact explaining the combined margin.
Discussion and conclusion
Terrorist attacks prevent countries from attracting inter-
national investment. Studying a large sample of firms
engaging in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, we
document that a one sample standard deviation increase
in terrorist attacks reduces the expected investment in
the country of a given firm by roughly 30%.
Methodologically, our results contribute to the literature
by employing a firm-level analysis rather than a nation-level
analysis. We compare decisions by the same firm through
means of a fixed effects strategy, which rules out that varia-
tion among investing firms explains these results. We also
show that a comparable analysis at aggregated level may put
the estimated impact 30% higher or lower, depending on
the choice of control variables. Related literature, mostly
based on country-level analyses, reports a similarmagnitude
for a one standard deviation increase in terrorism, although
the bandwidth is large. Powers & Choi (2012) on the one
hand report a roughly 56% decline in investment following
a one standard deviation increase in terrorism,8 but Abadie
&Gardeazabal (2008)9 andOuyang&Rajan (2017) report
21% and 11%, respectively.
The firm-level analysis also allows us to study entry
choices in more detail. In our sample, firms respond to
terrorism by withholding the entire investments – an
extensive margin. There is little evidence to suggest that
firms adapt the size of their investment. Arguably, this
amplifies the negative consequences of terrorism, as
recent insights from the trade and investment literatures
suggest that the complete exits are harder to reverse, and
have substantial macroeconomic costs.
We find no evidence that firms are more fearful of
business-targeting attacks than of other attacks, nor that
they fear attacks on businesses’ physical assets or personnel
more than other forms of attacks. This suggests that the
indirect costs of terrorism, for instance in terms of disrupt-
ing overall business environments, hampering local trade
and logistics, and damaging reputations, may be as large as
the direct costs of damaged property and risks to staff. This
runs counter to the findings of Powers & Choi (2012).
These results are relevant to theories of capitalist peace.
They confirm that international investors are sensitive to
local terrorism, and may punish conflicts or poor policies
to prevent them with exit. Importantly, our results also
suggest that it is not just hostility to (foreign) firms that
makes investors leave. Rather, terrorist attacks in general
are discouraging, suggesting that economic openness may
punish many different types of internal conflict.
A non-negligible qualification to our results is that they
still leave room in the interpretation of the causal effects of
terrorism. Despite differencing out firm-level fixed effects
to rule out potential endogeneity from firm-level charac-
teristics and shocks, endogeneitymay remain in our results.
At the country level, terrorism may respond to investment
decisions, for instance, and unobserved country-level
shocks correlated to terrorism and investment may be
imperfectly controlled for.Hence, our estimates employing
firm-level fixed effects should be seen as complementary to
efforts to eliminate endogeneity deriving from the host
country through time-series instrumentation of terrorism
(e.g. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Youvas, 2014).
8 The article does not report standard deviation impacts, but the
coefficient can be re-interpreted using the standard deviation from
the GTD data that also underlie our study.
9 A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows the coefficient of terrorist
risk on FDI over GDP of –0.003; multiplied with the risk standard
deviation 19.83; relative to the mean FDI in GDP of 0.28.
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Appendix A
Table IV. Analysis of aggregated flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Attacks/cap 0.115*** 0.159*** 0.106**
(0.0403) (0.0579) (0.0495)
Business attacks 0.888*** 1.037*** 0.816** 0.354
/cap (0.305) (0.353) (0.349) (0.383)
Non-business 0.0822
attacks/cap (0.0568)
log GDP 0.162** 0.165** 0.163**
(0.0709) (0.0708) (0.0707)
log GDP/cap 0.282** 0.281** 0.280**
(0.111) (0.113) (0.112)
log Distance 0.146** 0.143** 0.146**
(0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0701)
Common language 0.0304 0.0318 0.0311
(0.214) (0.214) (0.213)
Colonial tie 0.644* 0.633* 0.642*
(0.331) (0.331) (0.332)
Common religion 0.395 0.421 0.397
(0.400) (0.401) (0.399)
Real exchange 0.00212 0.00189 0.00202
rate (0.00557) (0.00555) (0.00555)
Exchange rate vol. 3.863 4.081 3.945
(2.824) (2.871) (2.853)
Regulatory quality 2.444*** 2.474*** 2.450***
(0.453) (0.451) (0.452)
Rule of law 0.140 0.177 0.153
(0.558) (0.556) (0.559)
Control of 0.987** 0.958** 0.986**
corruption (0.470) (0.466) (0.470)
Voice and Acct. 1.791*** 1.744*** 1.779***
(0.502) (0.504) (0.502)
Govt. effectiveness 2.671*** 2.599*** 2.658***
(0.659) (0.646) (0.656)
Polity transition 0.0790 0.0823 0.0774
(0.375) (0.374) (0.375)
Battle related 0.0106*** 0.0141*** 0.0111***
deaths/cap (0.00391) (0.00438) (0.00412)
Trade openness 0.495* 0.496* 0.496*
(0.270) (0.273) (0.271)
Observations 5,358 5,358 5,197 5,197 5,197 5,197 5,197
Home-year FE no no yes no yes no yes
SD impact 0.300 0.222 0.390 0.254 0.281 0.206
se 0.0876 0.0670 0.110 0.0745 0.111 0.0784
Estimates from a Poisson model. Dependent variable: aggregated international M&A investments from the microsample. Standard errors
clustered at the host-country-year level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Replication data
The non-proprietary part of the dataset, codebook, and
do-files for the empirical analysis in this article, as well as
the Online appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.
org/jpr/datasets.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Caroline Witte, Sjoerd Beugels-
dijk, Steven Brakman, and Gerrit Faber for comments





Abadie, Alberto & Sofia Dermisi (2008) Is terrorism erod-
ing agglomeration economies in central business dis-
tricts? Lessons from the office real estate market in
downtown Chicago. Journal of Urban Economics 64(2):
451–463.
Abadie, Alberto & Javier Gardeazabal (2008) Terrorism and
the world economy. European Economic Review 52(1):
1–27.
Antras, Pol & Stephen R Yeaple (2014) Multinational firms
and the structure of international trade. In: Gita Gopi-
nath, Elhanan Helpman & Kenneth Rogoff (eds) Hand-
book of International Economics (Vol. 4). Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 55–130.
Bader, Benjamin; Nicola Berg & Dirk Holtbru¨gge (2015)
Expatriate performance in terrorism-endangered countries:
The role of family and organizational support. International
Business Review 24(5): 849–860.
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Todd Sandler & Javed Younas
(2014) Foreign direct investment, aid, and terrorism.
Oxford Economic Papers 66(1): 25–50.
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Todd Sandler & Javed Younas
(2018) Trade and terrorism: A disaggregated approach.
Journal of Peace Research 55(5): 656–670.
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio & Anthony Venables (2006) Multi-
national Firms in the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press.
Bergin, Paul R; Robert C Feenstra & Gordon H Hanson
(2009) Offshoring and volatility: Evidence from Mexico’s
maquiladora industry. American Economic Review 99(4):
1664–1671.
Bernard, Andrew B; J Brandford Jensen, Stephen J Redding &
Peter K Schott (2009) The margins of US trade. American
Economic Review 99(2): 487–493.
Biglaiser, Glen & Karl DeRouen (2007) Following the flag:
Troop deployment and US foreign direct investment. Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 51(4): 835–854.
Blanton, Robert G & Clair Apodaca (2007) Economic globa-
lization and violent civil conflict: Is openness a pathway to
peace? Social Science Journal 44(4): 599–619.
Blomberg, S Brock & Ashoka Mody (2005) How severely
does violence deter international investment? Claremont
Colleges Working Papers in Economics no. 2005–01.
Brandt, Patrick T & Todd Sandler (2010) What do transna-
tional terrorists target? Has it changed? Are we safer? Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution 54(2): 214–236.
Buch, Claudia M; Iris Kesternich, Alexander Lipponer &
Monika Schnitzer (2009) Financial constraints and the
margins of FDI. Bundesbank Series 1 Discussion Paper
no. 2009–29.
Bussmann, Margit (2010) Foreign direct investment and mili-
tarized international conflict. Journal of Peace Research
47(2): 143–153.
Chen, Maggie Xiaoyang &Micheal OMoore (2010) Location
decision of heterogeneous multinational firms. Journal of
International Economics 80(2): 188–199.
Collier, Paul (2006) African growth: Why a ‘big push’? Journal
of African Economies 15(2): 188–211.
Czinkota, Michael R; Gary Knight, Peter W Liesch & John
Steen (2010) Terrorism and international business: A
research agenda. Journal of International Business Studies
41(5): 826–843.
Darvas, Zsolt (2012) Real effective exchange rates for 178
countries: A new database. Working paper, Bruegel no.
(http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-
exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-database/).
Davies, Ronald B; Rodolphe Desbordes & Anna Ray (2016)
Greenfield versus merger and acquisition FDI: Same wine,
different bottles? ETSG Conference Paper Proceedings.
Delios, Andrew & Witold J Henisz (2003) Political hazards,
experience, and sequential entry strategies: The interna-
tional expansion of Japanese firms, 1980–1998. Strategic
Management Journal 24(11): 1153–1164.
de Soysa, Indra & Hanne Fjelde (2010) Is the hidden hand an
iron fist? Capitalism and civil peace, 1970–2005. Journal of
Peace Research 47(3): 287–298.
Di Giovanni, Julian (2005) What drives capital flows?
The case of cross-border M&A activity and financial
deepening. Journal of International Economics 65(1):
127–149.
Driffield, Nigel; Chris Jones & Jo Crotty (2013) International
business research and risky investments: An analysis of FDI
in conflict zones. International Business Review 22(1):
140–155.
Enders, Walter & Todd Sandler (1996) Terrorism and for-
eign direct investment in Spain and Greece. Kyklos 49(3):
331–352.
Enders, Walter & Todd Sandler (2012) The Political Econ-
omy of Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Enders, Walter; Adolfo Sachsida & Todd Sandler (2006) The
impact of transnational terrorism on US foreign direct
investment. Political Research Quarterly 59(4): 517–531.
14 journal of PEACE RESEARCH XX(X)
Erel, Isil; Rose C Liao & Michael S Weisbach (2012) Deter-
minants of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Journal of
Finance 67(3): 1045–1082.
Faber, Gerrit & Michiel Gerritse (2012) Foreign deter-
minants of local institutions: Spatial dependence and
openness. European Journal of Political Economy 28(1):
54–63.
Fielding, David (2004) How does violent conflict affect invest-
ment location decisions? Evidence from Israel during the
Intifada. Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 465–484.
Frey, Bruno S; Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer (2007)
Calculating tragedy: Assessing the costs of terrorism. Jour-
nal of Economic Surveys 21(1): 1–24.
Gaibulloev, Khusrav & Todd Sandler (2008) Growth conse-
quences of terrorism in Western Europe. Kyklos 61(3):
411–424.
Gaibulloev, Khusrav & Todd Sandler (2011) The adverse
effect of transnational and domestic terrorism on
growth in Africa. Journal of Peace Research 48(3):
355–371.
Gartzke, Erik; Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001) Invest-
ing in the peace: Economic interdependence and inter-
national conflict. International Organization 55(2):
391–438.
Greenhill, Brian; Layna Mosley & Aseem Prakash (2009)
Trade-based diffusion of labor rights: A panel study,
1986–2002. American Political Science Review 103(4):
669–690.
GTD (Global Terrorism Database) (2016) Codebook: Inclu-
sion criteria and variables. June (https://www.start.umd.
edu/gtd/).
Guidolin, Massimo & Eliana La Ferrara (2007) Diamonds are
forever, wars are not: Is conflict bad for private firms?
American Economic Review 97(5): 1978–1993.
Haskel, Jonathan E; Sonia C Pereira & Matthew J Slaughter
(2007) Does inward foreign direct investment boost the
productivity of domestic firms? Review of Economics and
Statistics 89(3): 482–496.
Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska (2004) Does foreign direct invest-
ment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In search
of spillovers through backward linkages. American Eco-
nomic Review 94(3): 605–627.
Keller, Wolfgang (2010) International trade, foreign
direct investment, and technology spillovers. In: Bron-
wyn Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (eds) Handbook of
the Economics of Innovation 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier,
793–829.
Kim, Dong-Hun & Peter F Trumbore (2010) Transnational
mergers and acquisitions: The impact of FDI on human
rights, 1981–2006. Journal of Peace Research 47(6):
723–734.
LaFree, Gary; Laura Dugan & Erin Miller (2014) Putting
Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the Global Terrorism
Database. London/New York: Routledge.
Lenain, Patrick; Marcos Bonturi & Vincent Koen (2002) The
economic consequences of terrorism. OECD Economics
Department working paper no. 334.
Li, Sali; Stephen B Tallman & Manuel P Ferreira (2005)
Developing the eclectic paradigm as a model of global
strategy: An application to the impact of the Sep. 11 ter-
rorist attacks on MNE performance levels. Journal of Inter-
national Management 11(4): 479–496.
Marshall, Monty G; Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers (2017)
Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and tran-
sitions, 1800–2016. Dataset Users’ Manual. Center for
Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/
p4manualv2016.pdf).
Mayer, Thierry & Gianmarco Ottaviano (2008) The happy
few: The internationalisation of European firms. Intereco-
nomics 43(3): 135–148.
Mousseau, Michael (2010) Coming to terms with the capital-
ist peace. International Interactions 36(2):185–192.
Nitsch, Volker & Dieter Schumacher (2004) Terrorism and
international trade: An empirical investigation. European
Journal of Political Economy 20(2): 423–433.
Ouyang, Alice Y & Ramkishen S Rajan (2017) Impact of ter-
rorism on cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As):
Prevalence, frequency and intensity. Open Economies Review
28(1): 79–106.
Pettersson, There´se & Kristine Eck (2018) Organized vio-
lence, 1989–2017. Journal of Peace Research 55(4):
535–547.
Polachek, Solomon; Carlos Seiglie & Jun Xiang (2012) Glo-
balization and international conflict: Can foreign direct
investment increase cooperation among nations? In:
Michelle R Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas (eds) The
Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 733–762.
Powers, Matthew & Seung-Whan Choi (2012) Does transna-
tional terrorism reduce foreign direct investment?
Business-related versus non-business-related terrorism.
Journal of Peace Research 49(3): 407–422.
Rodriguez, Peter; Klaus Uhlenbruck & Lorraine Eden
(2005). Government corruption and the entry strategies
of multinationals. Academy of Management Review 30(2):
383–396.
Sandler, Todd & Walter Enders (2008) Economic conse-
quences of terrorism in developed and developing
countries, an overview. In: Philip Keefer & Norman
Loayza (eds) Terrorism, Economic Development, and
Political Openness. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 17–47.
Schneider, Gerald (2014) Peace through globalization and
capitalism? Prospects of two liberal propositions. Journal
of Peace Research 51(2): 173–183.
Sheffi, Yossi (2001) Supply chain management under the
threat of international terrorism. International Journal of
Logistics Management 12(2): 1–11.
Hogetoorn & Gerritse 15
Silva, Joa˜o MC Santos & Silvana Tenreyro (2006) The log
of gravity. Review of Economics and Statistics 88(4):
641–658.
Silva, Joa˜o MC Santos; Silvana Tenreyro & FrankWindmeijer
(2015) Testing competing models for non-negative data
with many zeros. Journal of Econometric Methods 4(1):
29–46.
Spich, Robert & Robert Grosse (2005) How does homeland
security affect US firms’ international competitiveness?
Journal of International Management 11(4): 457–478.
Wang, Jing (2008) The macro determinants of M&A timing
in China. International Journal of Business and Management
3(9): 141–146.
Weede, Erich (2005) Balance of Power, Globalization and the
Capitalist Peace. Potsdam: Liberal.
Witte, Caroline T; Martijn J Burger, Elena I Ianchovi-
china & Enrico Pennings (2017) Dodging bullets: The
heterogeneous effect of political violence on greenfield
FDI. Journal of International Business Studies 48(7):
862–892.
Yeaple, Stepan Ross (2013) The multinational firm. Annual
Review of Economics 5(1): 193–217.
BABET HOGETOORN, b. 1993, MSc International
Economics & Business (University of Groningen, 2017);
Business Controller (2017– ).
MICHIEL GERRITSE, b. 1985, PhD in Economics (VU
University Amsterdam, 2014); Assistant Professor, Erasmus
University Rotterdam (2017– ).
16 journal of PEACE RESEARCH XX(X)
